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This paper combines experimental and field data to examine how authorities with
discretion over how rules are enforced penalize transgressors when the social context of
the transgression elicits expectations of leniency. Specifically, we test how transgressors
are punished when it is their birthday: a day that triggers expectations of lenient
treatment. First, in three scenario studies we explore individuals’ intuitions about how
they would behave and expect to be treated if they transgressed on their birthdays,
as well as how they would imagine penalizing a birthday transgressor. Second, using
more than 134,000 arrest records for drunk driving in Washington State, we establish
that police officers penalize drivers more harshly when it is their birthday. Then, in
a lab experiment in which we grant participants discretion over enforcing the rules
of an essay-writing contest, we test psychological reactance toward transgressors
who make their birthday salient, even subtly, as the mechanism behind this increased
stringency. We rule out several alternative explanations for this effect, including public
safety concerns, negative affect and overcompensation for bias. We conclude with a
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for the literatures
on punishment, rule-breaking, and legal transgressions.
Keywords: ethics, transgressions, punishment, leniency, psychological reactance, drunk driving
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have theorized about when and how to punish individuals who transgress laws, rules,
or regulations (Arvey and Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al., 1996), examined the consequences of
punishment, in particular its impact on the attitudes and subsequent behavior of the punished
individual (Ball et al., 1994; Podsakoff et al., 2006), and looked at how formal systems or
written policies and procedures shape punishment decisions (Beyer and Trice, 1984). Other work
has explored what motivates individuals to punish, and how their judgments of appropriate
punishment change as a function of the seriousness of the offense and the intentions of the offender
(Robinson and Darley, 1997; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Carlsmith and Darley, 2008). However, this
body of work has overlooked how the social context of a transgression influences punishment
decisions.
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In this paper, we examine how transgressions are penalized
when they occur in a social context that elicits expectations
of leniency. Transgressions that occur in a social context in
which the transgressor expects leniency put authorities with the
discretion over punishing them into a difficult bind, needing
to balance the motivation to meet the expectations elicited by
the social context with the competing motivation to punish
fairly and effectively. We argue that although transgressors
may believe that transgressing in a social context that elicits
expectations of leniency will lead to lighter penalties, this belief
is misguided. Instead, we argue that—contrary to intuition—
when authorities have a responsibility to enforce rules, but face
a conflicting motivation to be lenient, they resolve this conflict
in favor of harsher penalties rather than in favor of increased
leniency.
Our research makes several theoretical contributions.
First, we contribute to existing research on punishment by
exploring how the social context of transgressions influences
punishment decisions. Second, we extend our understanding
of how individuals manage conflicting motivations when
they have discretion over penalties. This is important because
situational factors that trigger expectations of preferential
treatment are pervasive, but many do not justify leniency in
punishment decisions. Third, our work extends the literature
on bias in punishment decisions by shifting the focus from
discrimination on the basis of demographic characteristics
such as race or gender to a focus on how people manage
competing motivations to act. Ultimately, this work informs our
understanding of the challenges in exercising discretion fairly
and effectively (Kadish, 1961; Sherman, 1984; Pierce and Snyder,
2012).
DISCRETION IN PUNISHMENT
While laws and regulations provide guidelines for how to punish
transgressions, individuals (e.g., managers, judges, or police
officers), and groups (e.g., panels, boards, or juries) typically
have discretion regarding whether and how much to punish
those who transgress. Discretion over arrests (Reiss, 1984) and
prosecutions (LaFave, 1970) is a central element of most legal
and regulatory regimes because it allows authorities to consider
an act’s potential mitigating circumstances. However, discretion
can also have negative consequences, including threats to due
process (Kadish, 1961), abuses of power (Vorenberg, 1976),
and biased treatment of individuals (Smith and Alpert, 2007).
Whether discretion can be exercised appropriately is important,
as exercising it poorly can delegitimize the work of authorities
and undermine the equity and the efficacy of enforcement
systems.
In the United States, the risk that discretion in punishment
leads to unfair treatment of certain demographic groups has
led to a number of high-profile initiatives to understand the
extent and implications of these biases (e.g., Police Executive
Research Forum, 2001; Lovrich et al., 2007). Most of these
efforts have focused on ensuring that those with discretion over
punishment do not treat transgressors differentially based on
their demographic characteristics. Meanwhile, public discourse
has neglected other potential biases affecting punishment
decisions. Here, we suggest that individuals have difficulty
managing situations where their formal responsibility to punish
conflicts with a situational contingency that leads to expectations
that a transgressor will be treated leniently.
Expectations of Leniency vs. an
Obligation to Punish
One body of work that focuses directly on how we are motivated
to punish is the literature on “just deserts” (Carlsmith et al.,
2002; Carlsmith and Darley, 2008). This research explores
how individuals shift their view of appropriate penalties for
a crime depending on characteristics of the act and its
perpetrators. The fundamental finding of this literature is that
individuals are motivated to punish crimes in proportion to the
magnitude of the harm they have caused and the availability of
extenuating circumstances for the act. Though some aspects of
the social context in which an offense occurs create extenuating
circumstances, the only contextual factors that have been
studied as motivations for leniency in punishment decisions
are those that are directly relevant to attributions of blame or
responsibility, such as whether the act was accidental (Carlsmith
et al., 2002).
However, transgressions always occur in a broader social
context. Elements of this broader social context may motivate
expectations of leniency, but are arguably unrelated to the crime
itself. Some elements of the social context create legitimate
reasons to treat transgressors gently. For example, there is
a norm of treating young people more leniently than adults
when they transgress rules, as there are good arguments for
why culpability is impaired before reaching maturity (Steinberg
and Scott, 2003). Similarly, victims of long-term domestic
violence and abuse are often punished with leniency, as
their violent crimes are considered more justifiable (Ammons,
1994). These aspects of the social context that motivate
expectations of leniency are often enshrined in legal structures,
as evidenced in different sentencing guidelines for juvenile
offenders, or special legal exceptions in the case of battered
women.
Other aspects of the social context that motivate people to
treat transgressors more leniently are less legitimate. Social norms
of deference to authority (Milgram, 1974; Cialdini, 2009) result
in higher-status individuals receiving more lenient penalties
than lower-status individuals, at least for minor-to-moderate
transgressions (Karelaia and Keck, 2012). The attractiveness of
a perpetrator also appears to motivate more lenient punishment,
even though how attractive someone is has nothing to do with
how a transgression ought to be penalized (Sigall and Ostrove,
1975; Piehl, 1977; Stewart, 1985). These aspects of the overarching
context of the crime clearly motivate more lenient treatment of
these offenders, but there are strong arguments against using
them as reasons for leniency.
“Special days” such as birthdays also elicit expectations
of preferential or favorable treatment that may extend to
expectations of leniency in the context of transgressions.
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Birthdays are part of a larger class of days that have social
or religious significance (e.g., Christmas, Yom Kippur) and
are associated with strong norms of helping, kindness, and
forgiveness. These days affect pro-social behavior such as
charitable contributions (Jiobu and Knowles, 1974; Waldfogel,
1993). Birthdays specifically elicit expectations of favorable
treatment, particularly for the individual whose birthday it is
(Greene et al., 1987). The fact that many retailers offer free goods
or services on individuals’ birthdays, from pints of beer to pizzas,
likely reinforces these expectations1.
It is not a big leap to suggest that the expectation that
individuals should receive special treatment on their birthdays
will even extend to expectations of leniency when important
rules are broken. On December 2, 2012, the rapper known as
“The Game” was pulled over by Los Angeles Police because
the car he was driving had invalid license plates. A celebrity
website recounted that although the car was unregistered, the
police released him and did not tow his car “because it was
his birthday.”2 The reason the website reported for the leniency
shown by the officers – “because it was his birthday” – suggests
that the strength of the social cues to treat people favorable
treatment on this day will extend to include leniency for legal
transgressions.
In this paper, we focus on the social context of birthdays as a
situational cue that motivates leniency for two reasons. First, even
though this norm should be irrelevant in punishment decisions,
for someone with the responsibility to penalize transgressors, a
birthday elicits a competing motivation to treat that particular
individual with leniency. Second, birthdays are ideal for studying
the effect of the social context in non-experimental field settings
because they are randomly distributed in the population: in
most contexts, authorities that apprehend transgressors do not
and could not have known it was transgressor’s birthday before
apprehending them. This means that birthday and non-birthday
transgressors are randomly assigned to punishers, reducing
endogeneity concerns about selection bias and causality when
identifying variation in punishment decisions using data from the
field.
Hypothesis 1a. Individuals will expect more lenient punishment
in a social context associated with preferential treatment (i.e.,
individuals will predict that transgressors will be punished more
leniently if it is their birthday).
The Transgressor’s Perspective
If someone is caught transgressing a rule on their birthday,
they have a choice between making that fact salient or not.
There are several reasons why transgressors are likely to make
salient a relevant fact that may motivate lenient treatment of
them (“But it’s my birthday!”). Individuals tend to volunteer
reasons for their misbehavior in order to save face and reduce
embarrassment (Goffman, 1955; Keltner and Anderson, 2000).
Individuals also use available reasons in an effort to excuse their
misbehavior and to transform how responsibility for actions are
understood (Snyder et al., 1983). Given the strong expectation
1http://www.mirror.co.uk/money/free-birthday-offers-deals-club-5260023
2http://www.tmz.com/2012/12/02/game-lapd-birthday-bentley-registration/
of favorable treatment associated with birthdays, we predict the
following:
Hypothesis 1b. If an individual transgresses on their birthday, they
will volunteer that fact in an effort to secure leniency.
The Authority’s Perspective
The person in a position of authority needs to manage competing
motivations to be lenient and to punish in a fair and effective way.
Several reasons suggest that these competing motivations might
be resolved in favor of increased leniency. Of course, the authority
might try to ignore the expectation of leniency and punish
transgressions as if this expectation did not exist. However, as
prior research demonstrates, individuals often proceed rather
automatically to enact scripted cues to behave in certain ways,
even when the cue is completely irrelevant to the behavior it
mindlessly triggers (Langer et al., 1978). Authority figures may
be more lenient in this situation because they mindlessly enact
this scripted cue.
Alternatively, it might be uncomfortable for an authority
to behave counter to this expectation, particularly if they have
the discretion over the transgressor’s punishment. Extensive
research shows that people tend to behave consistently with what
is perceived to be the normative expectation in the situation,
particularly when those norms are made salient (Reno et al.,
1993). Thus, if an authority figure has discretion over the
transgressor’s punishment, their motivation to comply with social
norms would also suggest they will treat the transgressor more
leniently.
Such a prediction, however, ignores important psychological
mechanisms involving the interaction between the transgressor
and the authority. If the transgressor draws attention to his
birthday, even subtly (as they are likely to, in an effort to
capitalize on the expectation they have that this will lead
to lenient treatment), this may shift the decision process
of the authority. Although authorities may be indifferent or
even positively inclined to treat a birthday transgressor with
leniency, they may be particularly sensitive to perceptions
that leniency is being solicited and react negatively to them.
Consistent with the drive to punish in a fair and effective way,
authorities may penalize transgressions more stringently when
the social context cues expectations of leniency, because they will
react negatively to any perception that their leniency is being
solicited.
There is sound theoretical basis for such a prediction of
stringency in psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966;
Miron and Brehm, 2006). Three factors support the argument
that authorities will experience psychological reactance when
their obligation to punish occurs in a social context associated
with expectations of leniency. First, individuals react strongly to
sources of external influence they perceive as restricting their
behavioral autonomy. In situations where individuals have the
discretion to help others, any perception that their benevolence
is not freely volunteered will trigger reactance. The level of
reactance triggered is magnified to the extent that the freedom
“not to help” is important (Brehm and Brehm, 1981, p. 171).
Since those charged with penalizing transgressions are strongly
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motivated not to help those whom they are obligated to punish,
any perception that an individual is attempting to capitalize on
aspects of the social context that trigger expectations of leniency
will elicit reactance.
Second, reactance effects increase when requests for help
appear inappropriate or illegitimate (Berkowitz, 1969, 1973). For
example, Berkowitz (1969) found that individuals were less likely
to help when they felt they were being coerced, and Gibbons
and Wicklund (1982) suggested that acts of spontaneous helping
require a situational cue to help that is both salient and legitimate.
In other words, although a birthday might be a legitimate reason
to let someone choose a restaurant that no one else likes, a
birthday is an inappropriate reason to excuse him from the
consequences of transgressing rules or laws. Thus, making a
transgressor’s birthday salient in the context of a transgression
will likely elicit reactance.
Finally, when authorities have an obligation to penalize
transgressions, they are motivated to ensure that the punishment
is fair and appropriate. Brehm and Cole (1966) found that
requests for help were counterproductive and elicited reactance
when target participants were told to evaluate the person
requesting help accurately. A motivation to treat someone fairly
and appropriately is similar to a motivation to evaluate someone
accurately. Thus, we argue that even a subtle perception that a
transgressor is trying to use aspects of her social context to solicit
more lenient treatment will trigger psychological reactance –
because this will lead the authority to perceive that their freedom
to exercise that discretion is being threatened.
Hypothesis 2. When a transgression occurs in a social context that
elicits expectations of leniency, individuals with discretion over
penalizing that transgression will react negatively to any action that
makes this expectation salient (such as mentioning the fact that it is
a transgressor’s birthday).
We argue that when individuals perceive that someone is
demanding something from them, whether the demand is
explicit (actively soliciting leniency) or implicit (making salient
an element of the social context that creates an expectation
of leniency), they will experience the demand as a threat to
their autonomy, and become less inclined to do it (Berkowitz,
1973). Regardless of the source of the perceived autonomy threat
(e.g., choice restrictions, influence from norms, suggestions),
individuals are motivated to counter the restriction and take
actions to reestablish the threatened autonomy (Brehm, 1966).
This reactance can operate below conscious awareness or intent
(Chartrand et al., 2007) but can be extreme enough to cause a
behavioral backlash in which the individual does the opposite
of what she believes she is being asked to do (Fitzsimons and
Lehmann, 2004). Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 3a. Transgressions will be penalized more stringently
when the social context in which the transgression occurs creates
expectations of leniency (such as when it is the transgressor’s
birthday).
Hypothesis 3b. The increased stringency with which transgressions
will be penalized when the social context elicits expectations of
leniency will be mediated by psychological reactance.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We now present six studies that test this argument using multiple
methods and data sources. First, a series of scenario studies
establishes that birthdays do represent a social context in which
transgressors expect leniency, even though when individuals
imagine themselves as authority figures with discretion over
punishment decisions, they report higher levels of psychological
reactance toward birthday offenders. Second, using 9 years of
DUI (Driving Under the Influence) arrest records in the state
of Washington (over 134,000 arrest records), we show that
police officers punish marginal offenders more stringently on
their birthdays than on other days. In a series of robustness
checks, we show that it is unlikely that these results are explained
by substantive differences in intoxication or public safety risk,
but are instead likely based on the discretionary decisions of
officers. Third, in a lab experiment in which we vary the
birthday status of individuals who have transgressed rules, we
demonstrate that individuals treat transgressors more stringently
on their birthdays as a function of the psychological reactance
triggered by the birthday status of the transgressor. A final study,
using a similar experimental paradigm in the lab, rules out
overcompensation for bias as the mechanism behind our effects.
Studies 1a–c: Individuals’ Intuitions
about Birthday Transgressions
We ran three studies, in separate online samples, to explore
individuals’ intuitions about whether they would expect to be
treated leniently if they were pulled over for drunk on their
birthday (Study 1a), whether they would volunteer that it was
their birthday if they happened to be pulled over by a police
officer on that day (Study 1b), and what they believe they would
do themselves if they had discretion over penalizing a marginally
drunk driver on their birthday (Study 1c). Together, our aim was
to build a picture of what might occur in an actual interaction
between a transgressor and an authority with discretion over
penalizing the transgression on the transgressor’s birthday. These
studies were conducted on Amazon Turk, an online labor market
where ‘requesters’ can post short tasks for ‘workers’ to complete
for a small fee. Studies have found that data collected through
Amazon Turk are of comparable quality to data collected through
more traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman
et al., 2013; Hauser and Schwarz, 2015).
Study 1a
The first solicited individuals’ intuitions about how they expect
they would be treated if they made their birthday salient in the
context of transgressing. We predicted that their intuition would
be that they would be treated more leniently on their birthdays.
Participants and procedure
We paid 306 participants (60% male; Mage = 32 years, SD= 11.1)
$0.50 to respond to a scenario. There were three conditions in the
experiment. In a control condition, nothing about a birthday was
mentioned. In two additional conditions, we asked participants to
imagine it was their birthday, which they either mentioned to the
officer [birthday-mentioned] or not [birthday-not-mentioned].
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We included a birthday-not-mentioned condition to understand
whether individuals’ intuitions about their treatment would
depend on whether or not they made their birthday salient to the
officer. The scenario read:
Imagine you are driving home after an evening out with friends.
You had a couple of drinks but you feel OK driving home by
yourself. As you are driving, the local police stop you. The officer
notices a faint smell of alcohol, though you are speaking clearly.
To be safe, they ask you to take a breathalyzer test. It turns out
that your blood alcohol content is 0.075%. The legal limit is 0.08%.
Since your BAC is just below the legal limit, the local cops have
discretion about how to proceed. While they are not required to
arrest you, they may do so and test you again at the police station.
They may also choose to release you with a warning. [birthday-
mentioned: Imagine also that it is your birthday. You [birthday-
not-mentioned: do not] mention this to the police officer who has
stopped you.]
Participants were then asked to make a forced choice
prediction about whether the officer would arrest them or release
them with a warning.
Results
No one failed the attention check in this study, and everyone
completed the main outcome measures; thus, results are reported
for the whole sample. There were significant differences by
condition in terms of the proportion of respondents who believed
they would be arrested, χ2(1, N = 306) = 9.45, p = 0.009. When
asked to predict what the officer would do, 25% of respondents
in the birthday-mentioned condition and 35% of respondents
in the birthday-not-mentioned condition believed they would
be arrested, which represent more lenient treatment than the
45% of respondents in the control condition who predicted
they would be arrested. Greater leniency was predicted in the
two birthday conditions, compared to the control condition,
χ2(1, N = 306) = 7.21, p = 0.007. The difference between
the birthday-mentioned and birthday-not-mentioned condition
was not statistically significant at conventional levels, χ2(1,
N = 209) = 2.43, p = 0.12, although the results were consistent
with greater expectations of leniency in the birthday-mentioned
condition, compared to the birthday-not-mentioned condition.
These results provide support for Hypothesis 1a, that individuals
expect lenient treatment for transgressing when it is their
birthday, particularly if they mentioned it.
Study 1b
This study solicited individuals’ intuitions about they would do if
they were stopped for drinking and driving on their birthday, as
well as reasons behind their choice.
Participants and procedure
We paid 112 participants (56% male; Mage = 34 years, SD= 10.5)
$0.50 to answer five questions and complete some basic
demographic information. Participants read:
It is your birthday, and you’ve been out with friends celebrating.
While driving home, you get pulled over by a police officer and asked
to take a breathalyzer test. In your interactions with the driver, do
you mention to the police officer that it is your birthday?
We then asked them to indicate (on a 5-point scale) to what
extent they agreed with four statements about why they might
have made the choice they did: (1) It would result in the most
lenient treatment from the officer; (2) It was the best excuse for
my behavior; (3) It was the most appropriate choice to make; and
(4) It would be the easiest thing to do.
Results
We did not include an attention check in this study, so
results are reported for the whole sample. Thirty-five of the
respondents (31%) said that they would mention their birthday
to the officer. Those who said they would mention their
birthday to the officer reported significantly higher levels of
agreement with the statements that doing so: (1) would result
in more lenient treatment from the officer [Mmentioned = 3.31,
SD = 1.02 vs. Mnot mentioned = 2.05, SD = 0.83, t(110) = 6.94,
p < 0.001], (2) was the best excuse for their behavior
[Mmentioned= 3.20, SD= 1.16 vs. Mnot mentioned= 1.83, SD= 0.79,
t(110) = 7.33, p < 0.001], and (3) would be the easiest thing
to do [Mmentioned= 3.69, SD = 0.90 vs. Mnot mentioned = 2.78,
SD = 1.19, t(110) = 4.02, p < 0.001]. Both groups reported their
choice was equally appropriate [Mmentioned = 3.26, SD = 0.78 vs.
Mnot mentioned = 3.29, SD = 1.36, t(110) = 0.12, p = 0.91]. These
results provide some support for Hypothesis 1b. A substantial
minority of individuals claim that they would mention it was
their birthday to a police officer if they transgressed on their
birthday. In addition, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, individuals
who reported they would mention it was their birthday expected
that doing so would lead to more lenient punishment for their
offense.
Study 1c
In our final scenario study, we asked participants to imagine
themselves in the role of the police officer. We wanted to see
if the leniency they predicted they would receive as the driver
would translate when they imagined themselves in the role of
the police officer. We also wanted to assess how individuals in
the role of the authority reacted to different ways that drivers
might make their birthday salient, as a preliminary test of
Hypothesis 2.
Participants and procedure
We paid 273 participants (62% male; Mage = 32 years, SD = 9.8)
$0.50 to respond to a scenario. The experiment had four
conditions: a control condition, and three birthday conditions
(mentioned, soliciting-leniency, and noticed). We included
several different birthday conditions to develop a more complete
understanding of the outcomes of a range of possible interactions
between the driver and officer. The scenario read:
Imagine you are a police officer conducting a road patrol. When you
stop the next driver, you notice a faint smell of alcohol, though he is
speaking clearly. To be safe, you require him to take a breathalyzer
test. It turns out his blood alcohol content is 0.075%. The driver is
under the 0.08% legal limit for Blood Alcohol Content (BAC), so
you are not required to arrest him. However, you’re concerned the
breathalyzer test might not accurately reflect the impairment level
of the driver, so you might want to arrest him as well.
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[Control] As you consider your decision, he tells you that he is on
his way home from dinner.
[Birthday-mentioned] As you consider your decision, he tells you
that he is on his way home from dinner, and mentions that it is his
birthday today.
[Birthday-soliciting-leniency] As you consider your decision, he
tells you that he is on his way home from dinner, and mentions that
since it is his birthday today, it would be nice for you to let him go
with a warning.
[Birthday-noticed] As you consider your decision, he tells you that
he is on his way home from dinner. As you take his driver’s license
back to your vehicle for some paperwork, you happen to notice that
today is the driver’s birthday.
Participants were then asked to make a forced choice
prediction about whether they would arrest the driver or release
them with a warning.
We also tested individuals’ psychological reactions to the
scenarios. We used a 3-item measure of threat to freedom
that has been used to study psychological reactance (Dillard
and Shen, 2005). The items (“The driver tried to make my
decision for me,” “The driver was trying to manipulate me,”
and “The driver was trying to pressure me”) were measured
on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree
(α= 0.91). In addition, reactance theory suggested that threats to
one’s perceived autonomy might trigger “hostile and aggressive
feelings” (Brehm, 1966, p. 9), though the theory claims that
reactance may be present regardless of whether it is accompanied
by such emotions. Dillard and Shen (2005) measured this type
of negative affect using four items (irritated, angry, annoyed,
aggravated), on a 5-point scale that ranged from “not at all” to
“to a large extent” (α= 0.92).
Results
Four participants failed the attention check question in this study;
results are reported for the remaining 269 participants. There
were significant differences in whether participants reported they
would arrest the driver, χ2(3, N = 269) = 12.95, p = 0.005.
In the control condition, 21% said they would arrest the driver,
which was not significantly different from the 16% who said they
would arrest the driver in the birthday-mentioned condition,
χ2(1, N = 135) = 39, p = 0.53, nor the 12% who said they
would arrest the driver in the birthday-noticed condition, χ2(1,
N = 135)= 1.85, p= 0.17. However, when the driver mentioned
it was his birthday in an effort to solicit leniency, individuals were
significantly more likely (36%) to predict they would arrest the
driver, χ2(1, N = 135) = 3.87, p = 0.049 than in the control
condition.
The scenarios also elicited different levels of psychological
reactance in the participants, F(3,265)= 35.41, p< 0.001. Results
showed a significant linear trend, F(1,265) = 83.56, p < 0.001,
such that participants were significantly more likely to perceive
a threat to their freedom as the driver made the birthday
increasingly salient. The least reactance was reported in the
control condition (M= 1.95, SD= 0.93) and the birthday noticed
condition (M = 1.74, SD = 0.93), which did not differ from each
other (p = 0.22). This level rose significantly in the birthday-
mentioned condition (M = 2.68, SD = 0.93, p < 0.001) and
again in the birthday-soliciting-leniency condition (M = 3.30,
SD = 1.07, p < 0.001). The difference between the birthday-
mentioned and birthday-soliciting-leniency conditions was also
significant (p < 0.001).
Participants’ negative affect also significantly differed by
condition, F(3,265) = 5.44, p < 0.001. However, the birthday-
soliciting-leniency condition (M = 2.24, SD = 1.06) was
the only condition that significantly differed from the rest
(all at p < 0.001), which were statistically indistinguishable
from each other (Mbirthday-mentioned = 1.70, SD = 0.86;
Mbirthday-noticed = 1.63, SD= 0.83; Mcontrol = 1.69, SD= 0.81).
These results provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2,
that a transgressor’s birthday elicits negative psychological
reactions among individuals with discretion over their
punishment. In addition, the more obvious the effort to
capitalize on the social expectation of leniency, the more negative
the reaction.
Discussion
Together, these results suggest three things. First, birthdays
do represent a social context in which individuals expect
to receive lenient treatment for their transgressions – even
if the transgression is quite severe. Second, though still a
minority, a substantial proportion of individuals claim they
would mention it was their birthday to a police officer
if they were pulled over for drunk driving on that day.
Third, individuals imagining themselves in the role of a
police officer believe they would only treat birthday offenders
more stringently if the driver attempted to use that fact to
solicit lenient treatment for his offense. Third, even though
respondents reported they would only treat birthday offenders
more stringently if they used the birthday to solicit leniency
(this was also the only condition that elicited significantly
more negative affect from the respondent), any mention of the
transgressor’s birthday elicited psychological reactance. This last
finding suggests that individuals with discretion over punishment
may have more general psychological reactions to birthday
transgressors.
Study 2: Field Evidence from Drunk
Driving Stops by Officers
In Study 2, we use a unique sample of field data to identify
how individuals in positions of authority actually penalize
transgressions in a social context that elicits expectations of
leniency. Specifically, we study arrests involving suspicion of DUI
of alcohol in the state of Washington, and test whether otherwise
similar drivers are more likely to be arrested if it is their birthday,
compared to those for whom it is not their birthday.
Empirical Context
In all U.S. states, driving while intoxicated by alcohol (drunk
driving) is prohibited and has a severe impact on public
safety. Economists have estimated that intoxicated drivers create
externalities of at least 30 cents per mile driven due to social
welfare costs of traffic fatalities (Levitt and Porter, 2001).
Alcohol-related fatalities in the United States were estimated
to be 11,948 in 2010, representing 36% of all traffic fatalities
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that year (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
2010). Furthermore, deterring drunk driving is difficult, with
estimates that only one out of every 2,000 drunk drivers is
actually arrested (personal communication, Washington State
Patrol).
Driving under the influence laws are enforced by several
police agencies in Washington State, including the Washington
State Patrol, which is responsible for monitoring and enforcing
the state’s highway systems, as well as local agencies, including
municipal police, county sheriff ’s offices, and Indian Nations
agencies. In Washington State, DUI laws are primarily based
on the driver’s blood alcohol level (BAC). Drivers whose
BAC exceeds 0.08% are said to be in per se violation of
state law and have little legal defense. Such drivers face
minimum penalties of $865, 24 h incarceration, and 90 days
suspended license for their first offense. Drivers with BAC levels
above 0.15% are subject to even greater penalties, including
minimum fines of $1,120, 2 days incarceration, and a 1-year
revocation of one’s driver’s license. Penalties escalate rapidly
with repeat offenses. Figure 1 presents the average relationship
between drinking behavior and BAC, conditional on gender
and body weight, though food consumption, regular alcohol
consumption, and genetic factors also influence BAC. As the body
processes alcohol, BAC drops at an average rate of 0.015 per
hour.
When an officer suspects a driver of DUI, she typically
administers a field sobriety test. Furthermore, the officer
administers a mobile breath test (“breathalyzer”), which estimates
the BAC of the driver. If the officer determines the driver to be
intoxicated, the driver is placed under arrest and taken to a field
station for a formal (and admissible in court) breath test. If the
officer observes a mobile BAC greater than 0.08, the decision is
straightforward. The driver is almost certainly in per se violation,
and the officer arrests the driver. However, the decision is much
less clear if the mobile BAC is below 0.08. When the mobile BAC
is below 0.08, the officer has discretion over whether or not to
arrest the driver. Drivers with BAC levels between 0.04 and 0.079,
for example, are likely impaired, but less so than per se violators.
These “marginal offenders” are arrested at the discretion of the
officer. We use the term “marginal” to refer to drivers who fall
just below the per se blood alcohol threshold3.
Arresting the driver presents several potential costs for the
officer. First, the arrest process takes the officer off the road
for several hours and thereby precludes her from potentially
arresting an even more highly intoxicated driver. Second, drivers
who do not violate the per se rule are much more difficult to
prosecute, as a conviction must rely on the officer’s evaluation
of the driver’s intoxication. Consequently, prosecuting attorneys
typically discourage officers from arresting drivers with low BAC,
and most of these cases are plea-bargained (decided without
going to court) with minimal penalties.
Data
Our data include every DUI arrest in Washington State from
2001 to 2009. These data include the agency and identity of the
arresting officer as well as the name, age, gender, and ethnicity
of the driver. Also included are the date, time, and location of
the arrest. The data also note the primary criminal charge, which
allows us to exclude DUI arrests that are secondary to more severe
crimes such as weapons violations, violent crimes, or outstanding
arrest warrants. The data also identify the mobile BAC reading,
when taken, as well as the court-admissible BAC reading from
the police station. Since the data also identify the exact time of
each test, we know the length of delay before the driver was given
the court-admissible test. We present basic summary statistics in
Table 1 for both the pooled sample as well as the sample separated
by birthday/non-birthday. The average BAC for all arrests is
0.13, with 94% above the per se threshold. Approximately one
out of every 300 arrests is a birthday driver. The average age of
3We use this terminology to indicate that such drivers are at the per se margin, not
to understate the danger or seriousness of driving at these BAC levels. Driving with
a marginal BAC of 0.07, for example, still elevates the risk of injury and fatality
considerably, and we intend no judgment on the ethicality (or lack thereof) of such
behavior.
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between Alcohol Consumption and BAC. (A) Represents the average blood alcohol content for women based on number of drinks
(12 oz. beer, 5 oz. wine, 1.5 oz. hard alcohol) and body weight. (B) Represents men.
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Variable Mean SD Mean Mean
Field BAC 0.133 0.049 0.134 0.134
Per se violation 0.94 0.24 0.92 0.94
Field BAC – Station BAC −2.18 35.12 −1.06 −2.18
Minutes from field to station 60.73 46.75 59.17 60.74
Birthday driver 0.004 0.062 1 0
Driver age 34.33 11.38 37.08 34.32
Female driver 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.21
White driver 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.83
Number of observations 134,507 518 133,989
the sample is 34, 21% are female and 81% are ethnically white
(non-Hispanic).
One weakness in our data is that we are unable to observe
drivers stopped for suspicion of DUI but not arrested. Only
drivers who were arrested appear in our data, creating potential
survivor bias in any standard regression analysis. We will address
this weakness by exploiting the discrete threshold at BAC = 0.08
in order to infer distributions of non-arrested drivers in the
data. Another weakness is the relative rarity of birthdays, which
represent 0.38% of all arrests vs. 0.27% (one out of 365.25) of all
days. This rarity means that we must infer differences in birthday
traffic stops from a substantially smaller sample than the total
DUI database.
Identification Strategy
Using driver’s birthday as the context in which there is a
social expectation of lenient treatment has several important
characteristics from an identification perspective. First, the norm
of preferential treatment on one’s birthday is universally known
and widely observed. Second, birthdays are unobservable to an
officer prior to a traffic stop and thus unlikely to create an
unobservable selection bias in traffic stops. Third, birthdays are
randomly distributed and uncorrelated with other factors that
might affect officer leniency. This third point is critical for our
decision to examine birthdays instead of other holidays such as
Valentine’s Day, Mother’s Day, or Christmas, which may affect
the officer. An officer showing leniency on Valentine’s Day, for
example, may simply want to avoid a 2 h arrest that keeps him
from dinner with a spouse, or he may be in a foul mood due to
working on a holiday.
We identify officer stringency in DUI enforcement by
observing how often officers arrest per se offenders relative
to marginal offenders. While all officers must arrest per se
offenders, extremely stringent enforcement would entail an
increase in arrested marginal offenders relative to per se arrests.
Officers may be able to identify extremely intoxicated drivers
(e.g., BAC > 0.15) before a traffic stop, but it is unlikely
they would be able to ex ante distinguish between marginal
offenders and those with BAC levels just above the per se
limit. Consequently, the ratio of traffic stops that involve
BACs just above the threshold (e.g., BAC = 0.08) should be
approximately equal to the frequency involving BACs just below
(e.g., BAC = 0.079), as should the appearance of intoxication
when the driver is first confronted. Given the approximately
equal number of marginal and per se violators stopped and tested,
the relative frequency of arrest of marginal offenders relative
to borderline per se offenders is unlikely to reflect the choice
to stop drivers and instead will reflect the decision to punish
marginal offenders. This approach is similar to one recently
used to examine possible racial bias in DUI stops (Horn et al.,
2014).
Results
We first present birthday arrest frequency for marginal and
per se violators for four different bandwidths surrounding the
0.08 per se threshold (see Figure 2). The white bar represents
marginal offenders, while the gray bar reflects per se violators.
Whiskers reflect plus or minus one standard error. The four
decreasing bandwidths are represented from left to right, with
the furthest left group indicating plus or minus 0.04 and the
furthest right group representing plus or minus 0.01. Figure 2
shows a much higher level of birthday arrests for marginal
offenders than per se offenders, which suggests that discretion
leads to increased stringency for birthday drivers stopped by
police. Together, these results provide support for Hypothesis
3a, that birthday drivers receive increased stringency rather than
increased leniency.
Regression analysis
The goal of our analysis is to identify how the behavioral
interaction between the transgressor (driver) and punisher
(officer) are affected by the expectation of leniency associated
with birthdays. Consequently, we are concerned that the
increased likelihood of a discretionary arrest on birthdays
might simply reflect fundamental differences between the
characteristics of birthday and non-birthday drivers. Similarly,
FIGURE 2 | Study 2: Proportion of arrests of birthday drivers for
different bandwidths near the per se threshold. Marginal offenders
represent those drivers with BAC below the 0.08 threshold. Per se offenders
are above the threshold. Bars represent ±1 SE.
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the police who arrest them or the conditions under which they
are arrested might be different. To address this, we implement
regression analysis that estimates a decrease in the likelihood
of a birthday driver for all arrests above the per se threshold.
This approach is similar to a regression discontinuity design,
which involves estimating the impact of a discrete threshold
in a continuous independent variable on an outcome variable
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Snyder, 2010; Pierce and Snyder,
2012; Pierce et al., 2013). We cannot achieve the standards of
a true regression discontinuity design, because the extremely
rare occurrence of birthday arrests does not provide sufficient
observations very close (i.e., BAC values 0.079 and 0.08) to the
per se threshold. We therefore urge caution in interpreting any
causal relationship from our data.
Because officers cannot observe on which side of the threshold
a moderately intoxicated driver lies before arrest, the assignment
near the threshold is random for those stopped for DUI. Since
DUI stops are randomly assigned to either side of the threshold,
our theoretical argument is that the behavioral interaction
between the driver and officer is the mechanism driving any
discrete increase in birthday probability at the per se threshold.
Since this mechanism is difficult to directly identify in the arrest
data, the purpose of our regression model is to provide evidence
that this difference is not due to observable driver, officer, or arrest
characteristics that are correlated with birthdays but different
from our argued mechanisms.
Our first specification uses logistic regression to estimate
the probability that an arrest involves a driver birthday as a
function of the per se rule. If officers treated birthday drivers
identically to other drivers, we should expect arrests immediately
on each side of the threshold to have equal probability of
involving a birthday. Alternatively, if officers are more aggressive
in punishing marginally drunk drivers on their birthday, we
should expect a higher probability of a birthday for BAC < 0.08
and therefore a negative coefficient for the per se threshold. It
is important to account for the underlying relationship between
the dependent variable (birthday) and the continuous variable
that defines the discrete threshold (BAC). We include a quartic
polynomial of BAC as a control variable to allow for functional
flexibility in the relationship between drinking behavior and
birthdays.
Our base model with no control variables is presented in
column 1 of Table 2, with logit coefficients and robust standard
errors clustered at the officer level in parentheses. Column 2
adds flexible time controls, and column 3 adds controls for
driver age (quartic polynomial), gender, and ethnicity. Also
included are dummy variables for each county. Each column
shows a negative relationship between the per se threshold and
the probability of an arrestee birthday. The correct interpretation
for these results is that the probability of an arrestee birthday
distinctly drops when the BAC level crosses the threshold at
0.08% (thus removing the officer’s discretion). Providing support
for Hypothesis 3a, these models suggest that marginally drunk
drivers who are stopped are more likely to be arrested on their
birthday than on other days. To aid interpretation, we calculate
the marginal effects for the fully controlled model, which are
0.0018 (p = 0.06). Given the base rate of birthday arrestees of
approximately 0.4% of per se violators, one’s probability of arrest
TABLE 2 | Study 2: Regression models predicting birthday arrests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit OLS
Driver sample: All All All All
Dependent variable: Birthday Birthday Birthday Birthday
Per se violator −0.543∗ (0.265) −0.536∗ (0.265) −0.488† (0.259) −0.0021 (0.0013)
BAC 0.008 (0.013) 0.009 (0.013) 0.006 (0.013) 0.00003 (0.00005)
BAC2 −0.00003 (0.0001) −0.00004 (0.0001) −6.3e-06 (1.3e−04) −3.1e−08 (5.5e−07)
BAC3 5.3e−08 (5.4e−07) 7.5e−08 (5.5e−07) −3.8e−08 (5.4e−07) −4.7e−10 (2.1e−09)
BAC4 −8.4e−11 (7.4e−10) −1.1e−10 (7.5e−10) 2.8e−11 (7.3e−10) 8.4e−3 (2.7e−12)
Month/Day dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Age No No −0.363† (0.217) −0.028∗∗ (0.003)
Age2 No No 0.012† (0.006) 0.001∗∗ (0.0001)
Age3 No No −0.0002† (0.0001) −0.00002∗∗ (1.7e−06)
Age4 No No 9.1e−07∗ (4.1e−07) 9.4e−08∗∗ (9.3e−09)
Male No No −0.060 (0.112) −0.00007 (0.0005)
Driver ethnicity dummies No No Yes Yes
County dummies No No Yes Yes
Officer FE No No No Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0007 0.0370 0.0412 0.0451
Number of observations 134,507 134,507 133,795 134,507
Standard errors clustered at the officer level in parentheses. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01. Observations across models are not equal due to maximum likelihood
estimation dropping perfectly predicted groups. Fixed effects in Model 4 are at the officer level. p-value for Model 4 is 0.11. Small coefficients and standard errors listed
in scientific notation.
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increases by about 50% near the 0.08 BAC threshold on one’s
birthday.
As a robustness test, in column 4 we report a linear probability
model with officer fixed effects, since the rarity of birthday events
does not allow the use of logit models with fixed effects. The
linear fixed effect model produces a coefficient very similar to
our marginal effects, but with reduced statistical significance
(p = 0.11), which is unsurprising given the coefficient is only
identified off the smaller set of officers with at least one birthday
arrest. Still, this model suggests that our results cannot be
explained by the most stringent officers stopping birthday drivers.
Other multi-level models that might explore agency- or officer-
level predictors of stringency cannot be estimated, because few
officers or agencies experience more than one or two birthday
arrests.
We note that we cannot estimate the marginal effect at other
points farther below the threshold due to our identification
strategy. Furthermore, the low number of birthday arrests in
our data makes more formal testing of regression discontinuity
models difficult, so our results would be more compelling if we
could triangulate them using additional data.
To address possible differences in our non-birthday and
birthday samples, we also created a matched sample based on
observable driver demographics, BAC, and stop characteristics.
We implement a propensity score matching algorithm that
chooses the ten nearest non-birthday neighbors for each birthday
arrest, which reduces our sample to 5,117 arrests (some non-
birthday arrests are neighbors for multiple birthday arrests).
Using this matched sample, we repeat the t-tests and regressions
reported in Figure 2 and Table 2; these produce nearly equivalent
results. The proportion of birthday offenders remains higher
for marginal offenders for each of the four bandwidths used in
Figure 2 (p < 0.01), and the birthday coefficients for the three
models presented in Table 2 are very similar, despite a 96%
decrease in sample size: −0.523 (p = 0.06), −0.496 (p = 0.08),
−0.482 (p= 0.09).
Robustness tests
Our evidence of higher stringency toward birthday drivers
supports Hypothesis 3a, but raises a number of alternative
explanations. One natural concern with our identification
strategy is that BAC readings may not accurately represent the
public safety risks of birthday drivers, and that the increased
stringency we observe represents a rational police response to
expectations of future accidents or increasing intoxication. We
systematically examine these alternative explanations by testing
differences in arrested drivers’ characteristics.
We first address whether the mobile BAC of birthday
drivers stopped by police accurately reflects their level of
alcohol consumption, relative to other drivers. In this alternative
explanation, marginally drunk birthday drivers have alcohol
in their stomach that has not yet entered the bloodstream
due to binge drinking or a stomach full of food, and officers
arrest the driver because of their tacit knowledge that their
BAC will continue to climb above the per se threshold later in
the evening. In such a case, the decision to disproportionately
arrest marginally drunk birthday drivers would be rational and
show great foresight. To examine whether birthday drivers
are more likely to increase in BAC due to pre-stop drinking
patterns, we examine the change in BAC between the mobile
and station tests. This change reflects how much the driver’s
BAC increased or decreased between arrest and arrival at the
testing facility during a time where additional drinking was
not possible. The differences between average BAC changes
of birthday (−0.0011) and non-birthday (−0.0022) drivers are
indistinguishable (p = 0.50), as are the number of minutes
between the two tests (60.4 vs. 59.1, p = 0.51). This suggests that
BAC measures reflect equal intoxication of birthday and other
drivers.
We next address the alternative explanation that marginally
drunk birthday drivers may be inherently more dangerous than
their non-birthday counterparts and that stringency toward
them is a rational public safety response. For this alternative
explanation, we test whether birthday drivers are more likely to
drink (and drive) later in the evening, making their arrest a pre-
emptive strategy for law enforcement. The average time of arrest
is also nearly identical between the two groups (10:54 p.m. vs.
10:59 p.m., p= 0.58), suggesting that officers are not preemptively
arresting birthday drivers earlier in the evening to avoid later
drinking and driving.
We also examined whether arrested birthday drivers were
more likely to have it be their first DUI arrest (in the state)
compared to other drivers. To do so, we used only those drivers
where no officer discretion was involved (thus eliminating any
birthday bias), and found that although it was somewhat more
likely that birthday drivers were being arrested for the first
time compared to non-birthday drivers (91% vs. 89%), the
difference was statistically indistinguishable (Fisher’s exact test,
p= 0.19).
Another alternative explanation is that officers might punish
marginally drunk birthday drivers more stringently because they
believe birthday drivers are more likely to be “scared straight” by
the arrest. Although we cannot observe other confounds (such
as differences in conviction and sentencing), we tested whether
those whose first arrest was on their birthday were less likely to
be arrested for a later DUI. For per se violators (where discretion
was not involved), birthday drivers were slightly less likely to
reoffend (17% vs. 19%, Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.11), but there
is virtually no difference among the lowest per se offenders who
best approximate marginal offenders (BAC between 0.08 and
0.12). Birthday and other drivers both reoffended at a 17% rate
(p= 0.99). These suggest that there is no strong deterrence reason
why officers should arrest birthday offenders more often than
other offenders. Even if they are, it is not effective. Marginal
birthday offenders are, if anything, more likely than others to
reoffend after being arrested (30% vs. 17%, Fisher’s exact test,
p= 0.10).
Finally, we examine whether intoxicated birthday drivers were
more likely to be involved in an accident compared to other
drunk drivers. Arresting after an accident where the driver has
a positive BAC involve no police discretion (hence we had
excluded arrests involving accidents from our main sample).
To test whether officers may be arresting birthday drivers at
a higher rate because they have insider knowledge that they
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are more likely than other drivers to cause later accidents, we
compare the ratio of birthday drivers among those arrested for
DUI offenses ending in accidents (arrests excluded from our
main sample) to the ratio of birthday drivers among discretionary
DUI arrests. The percentage of drunk-driving accidents involving
birthday drivers is 0.43%, compared to 0.41% for discretionary
officer arrests (p = 0.39), suggesting that birthday drivers are
no more likely to get into DUI accidents than drivers on other
days.
This similarity in birthday rates for non-discretionary accident
rates also casts doubt on an alternative explanation that officers
give fewer breath tests to birthday drivers, and consequently
might show more stringency toward those under 0.08 to
compensate for this prior leniency. If that were the case, then
we would expect a lower average rate of birthday drivers in
discretionary tests (non-accidents) than in mandatory ones,
which we do not. Together, these tests cast doubt on alternative
explanations for police stringency toward birthday drivers, but of
course cannot disprove them.
Discussion
Of course, we cannot know whether drivers are actually soliciting
leniency in their interactions with police officers when they are
pulled over on their birthdays. However, if Study 1b is any
indication, a substantial minority of the individuals (31% of the
study sample) reported that they would mention their birthday
to the police officer. Alternatively, contrary to Study 1c, which
suggested that reactance in the condition in which participants
noticed the birthday was equal to the control condition, officers
in the field may react negatively to drunk driver even if their
birthday isn’t mentioned. Whatever occurs between the officers
and the drivers in the field, our analysis provides support for
Hypothesis 3a: drivers who are at the margins of the legal limit
for blood alcohol are more likely to be arrested on their birthday
than on other days. This effect appears to be unrelated to the
public safety risk of these drivers, their demographics, and the
conditions under which they are arrested.
Study 3: Testing Psychological
Reactance as a Mechanism in the Lab
The data from Study 2 do not allow us to test whether
psychological reactance explains the apparent stringency toward
birthday drivers, neither can they reveal whether this is a more
general behavioral response or whether it is idiosyncratic to the
setting of drunk driving. We address these concerns by designing
a laboratory experiment using a different type of transgression,
which additionally allows us to test psychological reactance as our
hypothesized mechanism (Hypothesis 3b).
Participants and Procedure
The behavioral lab at a UK-based business school (43% male;
Mage = 28.5 years, SD = 9.7) recruited 162 participants to
complete the study for a £10 payment. The study was approved by
the school’s Ethics Review Board, and met all APA requirements
for the ethical treatment of research participants.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions. There were two birthday conditions: one in which
the transgressor was using his birthday as a reason to solicit
preferential treatment (birthday-soliciting-leniency), and one
in which the transgressor merely mentioned it was his or her
birthday (birthday-mentioned). A control condition made no
birthday reference.
We informed participants that the lab was partnering with a
nearby school specializing in English as a Second Language to
evaluate a student essay-writing competition. Participants were
all assigned to the role of “evaluator” and tasked to judge three
of the essays competing for prizes. We also told participants
that, because teachers typically know the students in their classes
before grading any of their work, the students had written a short
paragraph about themselves, which would be attached to each
essay. We used actual example essays from the American College
Testing writing assessment arguing in favor of extending high
school by 1 year. We chose two essays that the assessment service
used as examples of poorly written essays (that had scored 1 and
2 out of 5) and one example of a good essay (that had scored 5 out
of 5).
We provided participants with a scoring sheet and contest
rules, which included a rule forbidding essays over 500 words
from being eligible for prizes. The rule read: “The students were
instructed to follow a 500-word limit. You should still grade
their essay if it is more than 500 words, but if they exceed
500 words, it is ineligible for the prize.” They were instructed
to judge each essay and asked whether they nominated any of
the essays for either the first prize (a 10% tuition fee refund),
or an honorable mention (a new backpack with the school
logo). Finally, they were told that the students were aware that
the essays were being evaluated by outside graders and that
competition winners, chosen by them, would be announced “this
coming Friday.” Instructions stressed that the competition had
meaningful outcomes for the students and that it was important
for them to take their job seriously. Each participant evaluated the
same three essays; however, the handwritten personal statements
stapled to the essays varied. There were three versions: one
written by a Brazilian female, one by a Mexican male, and one
by a Spaniard whose gender was not made explicit. Personal
statements were counterbalanced to ensure that any differences
in participants’ evaluations or prize nominations were unrelated
to the personal messages’ content, other than the birthday
manipulation.
The birthday manipulation was included at the end of the
personal statement attached to Essay #3 (the essay assessed
by the American College Testing service as the one of the
highest quality), which was always positioned last in the package.
The handwritten personal statement also included a message
that either mentioned the essay-writer’s birthday [birthday-
mentioned: “It’s my birthday next Friday, and I will be 22
years!”], or suggested that the essay-writer deserved the prize
because it was their birthday [birthday-soliciting-leniency: “I
really think I deserve the prize because it will be my birthday
the day the prizes are announced—I will be 22 years!”]. In
the control condition, nothing was mentioned about the essay-
writer’s birthday. This manipulation allows us to test whether
the participants who appeared to solicit leniency because
it was their birthday would be penalized more harshly, or
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whether simply mentioning the birthday would be enough to
elicit the stringency effect we observed in the drunk driving
data.
Measures
Participants were instructed to grade the essay’s unique ideas (10
points), persuasiveness (10 points), language quality (10 points),
and grammar, spelling and punctuation (10 points). These points
were summed to create a total score. We used participants’ scores
as a manipulation check to confirm that the essay containing the
birthday manipulation was evaluated as the “best” essay among
the three, and thus the most likely to be nominated for a prize
if the essay writer was not penalized for breaking the word limit
rule.
Mechanism: psychological reactance
We measured participants’ psychological reactance to each of the
essay writers’ personal statements using the same 3-item measure
of threat to freedom used in Study 1c (Dillard and Shen, 2005).
We measured the items for each essay writer (α = 0.83 for essay
writer 1, α= 0.86 for essay writer 2, and α= 0.82 for essay writer
3). To rule out the alternative explanation that negative affect
(anger or annoyance) was driving our effects, we also included
the same measure of negative affect used in Study 1c (α = 0.82
for essay writer 1, α = 0.86 for essay writer 2, and α = 0.82 for
essay writer 3).
Dependent variable: stringency
The word counts of each essay were handwritten on each of the
essays and circled. At 513 words, Essay #3 violated the 500-word
limit rule by 13 words. Neither of the other two essays violated
the word limit. The dependent variable of interest was whether
participants treated Essay #3 with increased stringency by not
nominating it for the prize even though it was the best of the three
essays.
Results
Five participants failed to complete all relevant measures, and
were excluded from the analysis. Results are reported for the
remaining 157 participants.
A repeated measures ANOVA with final score as the within-
subjects factor confirmed the ranking of the essays provided
by the American College Testing service. The essay scores
significantly differed from each other, F(2,155) = 326.55,
p < 0.001, and the score for Essay #3 (M = 32.0, SD = 5.9)
was significantly higher than the scores for Essay #1 (M = 23.1,
SD = 5.6) and Essay #2 (M = 15.4, SD = 6.6) scores. Thus, we
interpret the failure to nominate Essay #3 for the prize as evidence
that evaluators were penalizing this student for transgressing
the word limit rule, effectively disqualifying the writer from the
competition, rather than as evidence that the evaluator believed
the essay to be low quality.
We next established that participants’ psychological reactance
to the third essay was affected by the condition to which
they were assigned, F(2,154) = 3.98, p = 0.021. Consistent
with Study 1c, this pattern followed a significant linear trend,
F(1,154) = 7.95, p = 0.005. The highest levels of psychological
reactance were felt by participants in the birthday-soliciting-
leniency condition (M = 2.83, SD = 1.14), with slightly lower
levels by participants in the birthday-mentioned condition
(M = 2.58, SD = 0.91), and lowest levels in the control
condition (M = 2.27, SD = 0.96). Participants clearly reacted
more strongly as messages reflected more explicit attempts
to capitalize on expectations that they would be treated
preferentially on their birthday. Participants’ levels of negative
affective reaction to the third essay did not differ by condition,
F(2,154) = 0.11, p = 0.89, Mbirthday−mentioned = 1.21, SD = 0.47;
Mbirthday−soliciting−leniency = 1.26, SD = 0.53; Mcontrol = 1.25,
SD = 0.58. However, we note that our threat to freedom
measure correlates with our measure of negative affect (r = 0.44,
p < 0.001), indicating that a threat to freedom is experienced, in
part, as negative affect.
Hypothesis 3b predicted that an authority figure’s increased
stringency (in this case, penalizing those who violated
competition rules) as a function of targets’ birthdays is
driven by psychological reactance. We used Preacher and Hayes’
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to test psychological reactance as
the mediator in the relationship between transgressors’ birthday
statuses and whether they were denied the prize. Our design
uses a dichotomous outcome variable and a multi-categorical
independent variable. To test our predicted relationships, we
constructed dummy variables for each condition (birthday-
soliciting-leniency, birthday-mentioned, and control). For each
model, one dummy variable is specified as the independent
variable and a second dummy variable is included as a covariate;
the resulting test of the indirect effect represents the comparison
between the condition specified as the independent variable and
the reference condition (excluded from the analysis). The macro
generates bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for each
indirect effect.
We ran three models for all the relevant comparisons, each
using 5,000 bootstrap samples. We included the participants’
reactance toward the first and second essays as covariates
in the analyses, as the reactance measures were significantly
correlated with each other (between Essay 1 and Essay 2,
r = 0.68, p < 0.001, between Essay 1 and Essay 3, r = 0.37,
p < 0.001; and between Essay 2 and Essay 3, r = 0.39,
p < 0.001), and we wanted to ensure that our models used
the reactance triggered by our birthday manipulation as the
mediator of our effects, rather than the reactance the essay
writers’ messages elicited overall. Results for all three models
are reported in Table 3. Compared to the control condition,
the indirect effect of either birthday condition on increased
stringency via psychological reactance was positive, with 95%
confidence intervals that excluded zero, indicating significant
indirect effects via reactance. The indirect effect was largest
comparing the birthday-soliciting-leniency condition to the
control condition (point estimate = 0.31, 95% CI 0.035 to
0.709). The 95% confidence internal for the birthday-mentioned
condition compared to the control condition also excluded
zero (point estimate = 0.15, 95% CI 0.011 to 0.424). The
birthday condition in which the student explicitly solicited
leniency also showed a bigger indirect effect compared to the
birthday-mentioned condition (point estimate = 0.16, 95% CI
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TABLE 3 | Study 3: Model summary information comparing indirect effects of birthday and control conditions on stringency via psychological reactance.
Consequent
M (psychological reactance) Y (stringency in punishment)
Antecedent Coefficient SE p Coefficient SE p
For all models
M (Reactance to Essay #3) 0.42 0.19 0.028
Reactance to Essay #1 0.28 0.14 0.044 −0.68 0.34 0.048
Reactance to Essay #2 0.39 0.12 0.002 0.19 0.30 0.519
Comparing Birthday-Soliciting-Leniency to Control
X (Birthday-Soliciting-Leniency) 0.72 0.18 <0.001 −0.11 0.45 0.813
AB (Effect of X on Y via M) 0.31 0.17 95% CI: 0.035 to 0.708
Comparing Birthday-Mentioned to Control
X (Birthday-Mentioned) 0.34 0.18 0.057 0.09 0.42 0.835
AB (Effect of X on Y via M) 0.15 0.10 95% CI: 0.010 to 0.424
Comparing Birthday-Soliciting-Leniency to Birthday-Mentioned
X (Birthday-Soliciting-Leniency) 0.38 0.18 0.034 −0.19 0.42 0.646
AB (Effect of X on Y via M) 0.16 0.12 95% CI: 0.004 to 0.498
N = 157 for all models. Bias-corrected confidence intervals for the indirect (AB) effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples.
0.004 to 0.498). We ran this same set of models, including
negative affect as the mediator rather than reactance, and in each
case the indirect effect straddled zero, indicating that negative
affect does not explain the increased stringency toward birthday
offenders.
Discussion
In a substantially different paradigm and using a different type
of transgression, Study 3 shows that psychological reactance
to transgressors on their birthdays drives authority figures’
increased stringency toward them. It is interesting to note the
subtlety of the birthday manipulations in this study: even in
the birthday-soliciting-leniency condition, the student did not
use his birthday as an excuse for violating the rules of the
essay-writing contest, but merely said they deserved the prize
because it was their birthday. These subtle manipulations help
strengthen our argument that merely making the social context
of a birthday salient increases how stringently a transgressor will
be treated by an authority figure with the discretion to do so.
Additional tests confirmed that psychological reactance – the
subjective perception that one’s freedom is threatened – functions
as a mechanism behind this effect. In contrast, we did not find
empirical support for negative affect as a mechanism in this
study.
Study 4: Experimental Evidence on Bias
Salience as an Alternative Mechanism
A second alternative explanation that could drive our results
is overcompensation for bias. When attention is drawn to
factors that may bias an individual’s evaluation of a target,
a typical response is to try to correct for that possibility
by adjusting the judgment away from the direction of the
bias (Martin, 1986; Schwarz and Bless, 1992; Wegener and
Petty, 1997). Given the challenges in correctly estimating the
size of a potential bias, people often overcorrect for it in
practice, leading to disproportional responses in the opposite
direction (Wegener and Petty, 1995, 1997). We conducted
another experiment in the same lab, to test whether evaluators’
stringency could be explained by a concern that they might
be making a biased decision when it was the transgressor’s
birthday.
Participants and Procedure
The behavioral lab at a UK-based business school (31% male;
Mage = 25.7 years, SD = 8.3) recruited 101 participants to
complete the study for a £10 payment. The experiment used
the same experimental paradigm as Study 3, but employed a 2
(birthday-mentioned vs. control) × 2 (bias-salient vs. control)
between-subjects design. The study was approved by the school’s
Ethics Review Board, and met all APA requirements for the
ethical treatment of research participants.
This experiment used a manipulation which simply
mentioned the essay-writer’s birthday without actively soliciting
leniency [birthday-mentioned: “It would be so great to hear
that I won first prize next Wednesday, because it’s my birthday
that day and I’m already going to be celebrating with my
friends!” vs control: “It would be so great to hear that I won
first prize next Wednesday!”]. In the bias-salient condition, the
participants read these additional instructions: “The leaders at
the school are concerned that bias plays a role in who the teachers
normally nominate to win this tuition discount. Therefore,
you, as a lab participant, are helping us to understand if this
bias is occurring, and if so, how it might be affecting student
outcomes. Please be aware that what we know about people can
sometimes bias our assessments of them. Try to be as UNBIASED
in your assessments as possible.” If bias salience was driving
our effects, we should observe an interaction between the
birthday-mentioned and bias-salient conditions, such that
participants were more stringent for birthday essay writers in
the bias-salient condition, compared to those in the control
condition.
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Results
We ran a logistic regression with stringency as the dependent
variable, and birthday condition, bias condition, and their
interaction as independent variables. The coefficients for the bias
salience condition (B = −0.087, expB = 0.92, p = 0.93) and
the interaction of the two conditions (B = −1.23, expB = 0.27,
p = 0.31) were not significant, indicating that making the
possibility of biased evaluations more salient to the participants
did not strongly affect whether they treated the writer of Essay #3
with increased stringency. However, the same logistic regression
revealed a significant, negative coefficient for the birthday-
soliciting-leniency condition (B= 1.705, expB= 5.50, p= 0.046),
indicating—consistent with the findings of Study 3—that Essay
Writer #3 was treated with increased stringency in the birthday
condition. Together, these results are consistent with Study 3,
and suggest that overcompensation for bias is not a supported
alternative mechanism for our effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our evidence from the field and the lab was consistent
with the predictions of our theory. When confronted with a
social expectation of lenient treatment, individuals with the
authority and discretion to punish them treat transgressors more
stringently rather than more leniently. In our studies, we used
the transgressor’s birthday as a social context that leads to
an expectation of lenient treatment, as it has many attractive
characteristics that allow us to test this phenomenon in the
field. Increased stringency for birthday transgressors, which we
identified both in the field and in the lab, runs counter to what
individuals believe happens to transgressors on their birthdays.
We find that this effect is driven by psychological reactance
toward the transgressor. Moreover, psychological reactance
increases as the salience of the transgressor’s birthday increases
(as, we assume, is the perception that the target is using his
birthday to actively solicit lenient treatment).
Theoretical Implications
Our results contribute to several literatures. First, our research
contributes to a broader literature on punishment from
psychological perspectives (Treviño, 1992; Fragale et al., 2009).
Though theory has offered frameworks to evaluate when and
how to punish (Arvey and Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al.,
1996), examined its consequences (Ball et al., 1994; Podsakoff
et al., 2006), and looked at how aspects of organizational
context shape punishment decisions (Beyer and Trice, 1984),
we know less about how the social context of transgressions
affects punishment decisions. Even the literature on just deserts,
which focuses on motivations to punish, has only addressed
aspects of the social context that directly speak to the harm
the act has caused or justifiable mitigating circumstances for
it (such as the difference between intentional and accidental
actions). However, there are many aspects of our context that
may affect motivations to punish and punishment decisions,
with only tenuous relevance to the transgression. We know
little about aspects of our social context that ought to
be unrelated to punishment decisions affect those decisions
nevertheless. Our research addresses this gap by showing how
subtle contextual factors (it being the transgressor’s birthday)
play an important role in the ultimate penalties authorities
impose.
Second, this paper contributes to our knowledge of how
individuals behave when a context elicits two different
motivations with conflicting behavior prescriptions. The
large body of work in both psychology (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1991)
and economics (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002) that examines
the power of expectations on individual behavior has focused
primarily on how a single social norm motivates behavior.
Instead, our work examines how individuals respond to multiple
expectations elicited by the social context and that motivate us in
conflicting ways, and how these motivational conflicts they may
influence behavior.
Third, these findings extend our understanding of
psychological reactance among individuals with the discretion
over penalizing transgressions. Most of the literature on
reactance has focused on refusals to help others (Berkowitz,
1973), engage in more positive behaviors, such as healthier
lifestyle choices (Dillard and Shen, 2005), or pursue goals
(Chartrand et al., 2007). These findings show that reactance also
drives behaviors in punishment contexts, and confirms again
that even very subtle messages can elicit perceptions that one’s
freedom is being threatened, driving our behavior in the opposite
direction.
Ultimately, these findings help us understand how discretion
is exercised in the field, thus deepening our knowledge of how
discrimination operates. Work on discrimination has focused
almost exclusively on demographic characteristics such as age,
race, ethnicity, and gender (Paluck and Green, 2009). Our
research shows that other, less obvious factors will also lead
individuals to treat transgressions differentially. This suggests
that we need to extend our vigilance about how discretion may
undermine the efficiency of punishment. It also deepens our
understanding about the challenges humans have in debiasing
their judgments and behavior (Wegener and Petty, 1995, 1997),
particularly when individuals with discretion over how someone
is treated interact with that person in advance of imposing
penalties on them.
Practical Implications
Our research also has important practical implications, both
for alleged transgressors as well as those with discretion over
punishing them—from managers and teachers to judges and
jury members. Transgressors need to be aware that their
intuitions about avoiding punishment by making leniency norms
salient may backfire, resulting in harsher penalties than if
they refrained from making the norm salient. In other words,
transgressors may benefit from avoiding any perception that
they are trying to capitalize on contextual factors that would
suggest more lenient treatment. On the other hand, authorities
with the responsibility to punish should be aware that in the
face of conflicting motivations, they may make decisions that
undermine the fairness, and ultimately the effectiveness, of their
sanctions.
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Compared to others responsible for punishing transgressions,
law enforcement officials may be particularly likely to react
negatively to perceptions that offenders are soliciting lenient
treatment. They are accustomed to excuses and pleas for leniency
from those they penalizing, to the extent that such pleas can
become tiresome and prompt cynicism (Van Maanen, 1974).
Research on leniency in law enforcement suggests that officer
have “pet peeves,” including many related to the demeanor of
offenders, that may elicit reactive and more severe responses
(Schafer and Mastrofski, 2005). Contrition and verbally accepting
responsibility for one’s actions may elicit more lenient responses
from law enforcement, while soliciting special treatment may
trigger reactive responses (Schafer and Mastrofski, 2005). Indeed,
recent work by van Prooijen and Kerpershoek (2011) suggests
that individuals may inflict excess retribution when given
discretion to punish criminals, but only when they feel their
autonomy is threatened. Though our data do not allow us to
observe what specifically happens in the dyadic interactions
between drivers and officers in our field data, our scenario studies
suggest that driver behavior, and subsequent officer reactions to
those behaviors, are critical to outcomes.
Our research also has important practical implications for
managers, who are commonly given broad discretion to punish
employees through oral reprimands, work suspension, or, in
extreme cases, termination (Beyer and Trice, 1984; Butterfield
et al., 1996). In fact, punishment is a widely used managerial
strategy for producing desired changes in employee behavior
(Ball et al., 1994). Thus, it is important for managers to know
that they are also vulnerable to the challenges associated with
managing contradictory motivations that might influence their
actions.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that when authority figures have discretion
over punishment decisions, making an expectation that a
transgressor will be treated leniently salient leads to a negative
psychological reaction, leading individuals with the authority
to punish to do so more harshly. This might lead to the
conclusion that discretion is overrated or overused. Yet,
we do not want to suggest that our findings provide an
argument against discretion, only a fair warning about some
of its additional problematic qualities. Many dysfunctional
consequences result when discretion is unavailable, such as
under mandatory punishment guidelines (e.g., “three strikes”
laws). These consequences include higher rates of violence
and murders among repeat offenders and against witnesses
of repeat offenses (Marvell and Moody, 2001; Zimring et al.,
2001). Thus, eliminating discretion is likely not the answer.
The message we take from our findings is that authorities
with discretion over punishment should be vigilant about
how the situational cues may be affecting their psychological
reactions to the transgressors and ultimately, their punishment
decisions.
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